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Abstract 
The assumption that the communist dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
drove many people into suicide has persisted for decades, and is still evident in academia and 
public discourse. High suicide rates in Eastern Germany that can be traced back to the 19th 
century cannot, however, be due to a particular political system. Be it monarchy, democracy, 
fascism or socialism, the frequency of suicide did not change significantly. In fact, the share 
of politically motivated suicides in the GDR amounts to only one to two per cent. Neither 
political, economic, cultural or macro-social factors had a significant impact on the suicide 
rate. This is further corroborated by an analysis of two sub-levels of the GDR society which 
were more likely to be affected by repression: prisons and the army. In both cases no higher 
suicide rate is verifiable. Complimentary to the quantitative approach ‘from above’, a 
qualitative analysis ‘from below’ underlines the limited importance of repression, and points 
to a regional pattern of behaviour linked to cultural influences and the role of religion, 
specifically protestantism. During the last decades, an overly politicised interpretation of 
suicide in the GDR has also overlooked the importance of the social microclimate with weak 
suicide-inhibiting factors in East Germany. The persistence of the misperception was 
facilitated by several factors: The bereaved ones in the East, the media in the West and a few 
victims of suicide themselves blamed the regime and downplayed individual and pathological 
aspects. Moreover, state and party officials in the GDR unintentionally reinforced the 
politicisation of suicide by imposing a taboo fuelling the flames of speculation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Myths stemming from political taboos can have a long-lasting legacy. The history of suicide 
in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) provides an excellent example. East Germany 
consistently had one of the world’s highest suicide rates. 5 to 6000 people took their life every 
year amounting to a rate of 30 to 35 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants per annum. Compared to 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the suicide rate was about 50 per cent higher 
throughout the GDR’s existence from 1949-1990. Unusually high suicide rates were also 
registered in other socialist countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, some 
scholars attributed high suicide rates to the totalitarian atmosphere, namely political 
repression, surveillance, confinement and lack of freedom to travel.1 One statistical survey 
appears to support the myth that suicide rates in communist countries are generally higher 
than in democratic countries.2 One analyst even managed to identify specific links between 
high suicide rates and traits of totalitarianism.3 But these findings cannot constitute more than 
a misleading hypothesis. Suicide is a complex phenomenon with psychological, social, 
political, economic, pathological, criminal, philosophic, religious and gender implications. 
Hence unicausal explanations should be taken with a generous pinch of salt.  
The topic has not received much systematic attention. 27 years after German reunification 
there remains little knowledge of suicide under socialism, at least in the English-speaking 
world.4 The works of german scholars such as Reinhard Cordes, Werner Felber, Hans Girod, 
Ehrhart Neubert have received minimal attention.5 Mary Fulbrook is the only British historian 
who has delved into the problem so far. Her discussion of suicide in the GDR is, however, 
grounded on very few sources, and she arrives at a melange of shrewd observations and 
unsubstantiated speculations, which serve as little more than a starting point for further 
inquiries.6  
                                                        
1 See, for example, Ehrhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989 (Berlin: Christoph 
Links, 1997), 282-284; Rolf Degen, “Ex-DDR: Hohe Selbstmordrate”, Psychologie heute 18 (1991): 14f.; H. 
Hoffmeister, G. Wiesner, B. Junge and H. Kant, “Selbstmordsterblichkeit in der DDR und in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland”, Muenchener medizinische Wochenschrift 132 (1990), 603-609; Georg Siegmund, “Die 
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2 Steven Stack, “Culture and suicide: An analysis of 35 nations”, Paper read at the annual meetings of the 
American Association of Suicidology, St. Louis, Apr. 1996, cited in Armin Schmidtke et al., “The impact of the 
reunification of Germany on the suicide rate”, Archives of Suicide Research 5, no. 3 (1999), 233-239. 
3 Steven Stack, “Durkheim's theory of fatalistic suicide: A cross-national approach”, Journal of Social 
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Between Mass Death and Individual Loss. The Place of the Dead in Twentieth-Century Germany (New York: 
Berghahn, 2011); Felix Robin Schulz, Death in East Germany 1945-1990 (New York: Berghahn, 2013). 
5 One exception: Peter Grieder, “East German Totalitarianism. A Warning from History”, in Totalitarianism on 
Screen. The Art und Politics of The Lives of Others, eds. Carl Eric Scott and F. Flagg Taylor IV (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky 2014), 203-228. 
6 Benita Blessing, “Review of Fulbrook, Mary, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to 
This article scrutinises the impact of politics on suicide rates, and identifies the main factors 
that hampered and still prevent a nuanced understanding of why suicide was more prevalent 
in the GDR than, for example, in the neighbouring FRG. The following argument is based on 
comprehensive discourse analysis and an examination of several thousand suicides that 
occurred during 40 years of the GDR’s existence. Accordingly, suicide is both discussed as a 
statistical phenomenon at the macro level of society and as an individual event at the micro 
level. For this, a variety of sources are harnessed such as files from the police, the military 
and the Stasi, reports from education and health authorities, published and unpublished 
medical studies, interviews with experts and bereaved people, farewell letters and newspaper 
articles. The abundance of available quantitative and qualitative sources makes it possible to 
go beyond unsubstantiated claims and establish meaningful links between micro- and macro-
history. Based on these insights, this essay explains the origins and persistence of the Western 
(mis)-perception of suicide in Eastern Germany.  
 
A Spectre is Haunting the West: Academic and Popular Perspectives 
 
The assumption that political repression drove many East Germans to suicide haunted the 
West for decades. The spectre surfaced occasionally, temporarily became invisible then 
reared back time and again. In 1959 population scientist Roderich von Ungern-Sternberg 
claimed that ‘more difficult living conditions’ were the cause of the GDR’s high suicide rate, 
without outlining any details.7 In 1963, the West German news magazine ‘Der Spiegel’ 
placed particular blame on the regime for the high suicide rate of elderly people.8 As the 
governing party of the GDR, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) had stopped the publication of 
suicide data in 1963, authors could only allude to the ‘high but unknown’ suicide rate of the 
GDR.9 Nevertheless, during the following decades, several authors did not shy away from 
expressing strong views despite the lack of sound evidence. In 1977, for example, Konstantin 
Pritzel suggested that ‘burdens bred by the communist rulers’ coercive and terror measures’ 
contributed to East Germany’s high suicide rate. The author, a former member of the 
‘Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen’ that was partly financed by the CIA, even 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Honecker”, H-German, H-Net Reviews (June, 2006). 
7 Roderich von Ungern-Sternberg, “Die Selbstmordhaeufigkeit in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart”, Jahrbuecher 
fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik 171 (1959), 187-207; 200.  
8 “Selbstmord. Krankheit zum Tode”, Der Spiegel 17 (1963): 5 and 32. 
9 F. Unger, “Das Gesundheitswesen der DDR”, Deutschland Archiv 3 (1970): 1141. Cf. Jonathan Steele, 
Socialism with a German Face: The State that Came in from the Cold (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), 196. 
distorted statistics to support his misleading claim.10 Somewhat more cautiously, in 1986 a 
West German journalist asserted that ‘the totalitarian Marxism-Leninism, in connection with 
the tradition of Prussian statism’ could have generated ‘considerable suicidogenic factors’.11 
Scholars also continue to argue that political circumstances impacted the suicide rate in the 
GDR. In 1998, for instance, the sociologist of religion Ehrhart Neubert blamed the communist 
regime for suicides in his essay for the German edition of the ‘Black Book of Communism’. 
Neubert, a former member of the GDR opposition group ‘Democratic Awakening’, listed a 
number of suicides that he claimed were due to the political situation in the GDR and 
identified specific ‘suicidal structures’.12 Ines Geipel and Joachim Walther followed this 
thread in their study of unofficial literature in the GDR by stressing the political maltreatment 
and downplaying the private suffereing of the few authors who committed suicide.13 
A similar approach is evident in the writing of East German dissidents before 1989. The 
writer Juergen Fuchs, for instance, subtly alluded to the army’s responsibility for the 
prevalence of suicides among its recruits in his text ‘Das Fussballspiel’.14 More generally, 
Hermann von Berg, author of an opposition manifesto published in 1978 asked: ‘Why does 
the German Democratic Republic have some of the highest rates of divorce, suicide and 
alcohol abuse?’.15 The politically motivated censorship used by the SED unintentionally 
fuelled such speculations about the apparently strong correlation between suicide and 
communist dictatorship.  
These misleading academic and literary discourses were paralleled in a few films and 
television series. In 1966, for instance, the West German TV series ‘Die fuenfte Kolonne’ 
featured the episode ‘Das verraeterische Licht’ in which a secretary commits suicide after 
being forced to spy for the Stasi. The secretary Beate Zoellner is employed by a Munich-
based enterprise that carries out research for NATO. Her East German brother has helped a 
friend to escape from the GDR and is sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Exploiting his ill 
health, the Stasi approaches Miss Zoellner with the promise that her brother will be released if 
she takes pictures of secret documents. Due to some mishaps, the deal doesn’t work out. West 
German intelligence intervenes and discovers her guilt. Ashamed that she has deceived her 
                                                        
10 Konstantin Pritzel, “Der Selbstmord im sozialistischen Paradies”, Berliner Aerzteblatt 90 (1977): 1114.  
11 Michael Haller, ed., Freiwillig sterben – freiwillig? (Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1986), 32f. 
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14 Juergen Fuchs, Gedaechtnisprotokolle (Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977), 22. 
15 Manfred Wilke, “Wieslers Turn to Dissidence and the History behind the Film”, in The Lives of Others and 
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boss, who trusted her unquestioningly, and scared by the prospect of being convicted, Miss 
Zoellner throws herself under a train. The episode’s message is banal: The only reason for her 
desperate deed is blackmail by the Stasi. 
Forty years later, the box-office hit ‘The Lives of Others’ revived and renewed the totalitarian 
framing of East Germany’s suicide rates. It is worth examining closely how the movie presents 
suicide. ‘The Lives of Others’ features the suicide of theatre director Albert Jerska who hangs 
himself after being banned from his profession for years. Apparently, the vast majority of the 
film’s audience considered suicide as a representation of suffering in a world deprived of 
artistic freedom. In an exemplary comment Mary-Elizabeth O’Brien commended the movie 
because it ‘does not shy away from showing the cost in human lives for defying the SED 
dictatorship, especially in its depictions of suicides.’16 However, it should be noted that Jerska 
belonged to the milieu of privileged state artists with a good chance of bypassing narrow-
minded cultural policy. His occupational ban dates back to the time when dozens of prominent 
artists unsuccessfully petitioned against the denaturalisation of singer-songwriter Wolf 
Biermann in November 1976. Disappointed with the hard-line attitude of the SED, many artists 
left the GDR, or negotiated temporary exit visa. For Jerska these options don’t seem to exist 
because he still feels strongly connected with the communist ideology and never envisages 
leaving the country he considers the better Germany. Reducing his suicide to political 
repression would disregard Jerska’s other problems which the film also reveals. Jerska’s friends 
offer him help but he refuses, presumably in a state of depression. His high consumption of 
alcohol might have further encouraged suicidal tendencies. The reality for most East German 
dissidents was different. Although many had to work in under-qualified jobs, when all other 
options were exhausted, they emigrated.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that suicides inspired by opposition to the regime did occur in the 
GDR. The film becomes utterly misleading when, however, this individual case is linked with 
the suicide rate. Notably, the fictional playwright Georg Dreyman does not blame the regime 
directly for his friend’s death in his eulogy. He accuses the GDR of coldheartedly ignoring 
people who commit suicide. It might be that ‘Dreyman is drawn first to investigate and then 
to expose in the West the high incidence of suicide in East Germany’ but to be precise, the 
film tells a somewhat different story.17 There is no indication that Dreyman has access to 
suicide figures, which would have been unrealistic. Dreyman’s embittered words of farewell 
                                                        
16 Mary-Elizabeth O’Brien, Post-Wall German Cinema and National History. Utopianism and Dissent 
(Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2012), 158. 
17 Joye Weisel-Barth, “Voyeuristic Pleasures and Complexity Theory: The Lives of Others”, International 
Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psychology 3 (2008): 115. 
become source material for an essay that he manages to smuggle to West Berlin. Following its 
publication in the weekly journal ‘Spiegel’, it is West German TV news that connects East 
German suicide rate to recent suicides of artists. In doing so, the film unintentionally shows 
how individual despair in the East is transformed into a political accusation by Western 
media. 
The film does contain hidden details that go against a too simplistic view. But the film as a 
whole conveys a fatalistic impression of life in the GDR. The totalitarian atmosphere of the 
film, the clear distinction of victims and perpetrators (with Wiesler the only exception) creates 
empathy with the victims and passes on an underlying message along the line of: ‘Suicide is, 
of course, a metaphor for the tragic loss of vitality and life under totalitarianism; and 
underlying the film, heavy as a basso continuo, is this tragic sense of loss and waste–the 
repression, squandering, and death of talent, productivity, pleasure, and hope.’18 Despite the 
abovementioned subtleties, the plot seems to suggest a link between political repression and 
suicide.19 Apparently, the movie’s emotional effects appear to have a stronger impact than 
authentic details. In a way, an underlying gravitational pull of this kind of reductionism is also 
characteristic of the discourse about East German suicides that has persisted for decades. 
Nevertheless, there were debates within academia about East German suicide rates that 
challenged the Cold War stereotype. East and West German medical statisticians and 
psychiatrists discussed the issue around 1961, the year when the Berlin Wall was built. In 
1956, the GDR had begun publishing yearly suicide rates. In view of the high numbers, East 
and West German experts both employed Durkheim’s theory of anomy to argue that social 
and political changes in East Germany might have increased the suicide rate.20 But this claim 
was rapidly challenged. The territory occupied by the GDR, it was noted, had a long history 
of high suicide rates. Reinhard Cordes and others provided convincing evidence that the GDR 
had inherited regions with higher-than-average suicide rates.  
Since the beginning of statistical surveys in the 19th century, the ratio of suicide rates in those 
areas which later constituted the GDR and the FRG respectively was roughly three to two. 
Political factors are very unlikely to have had a significant impact considering the relative 
constancy of suicide rates under monarchy, democracy and dictatorship. Be it the German 
Empire, the Weimar Republic or the Third Reich, long-term regional differences determined 
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the frequency of suicide as a matter of ‘longue duree’. In the 1960s, that insight did become 
accepted among experts in East and West to some extent.21 This consensus had, however, 
minimal impact on the public. In West Germany, neither politicians nor journalists accepted 
the academic consensus. And in the GDR, the leadership of the SED was also sceptical. The 
politburo feared that high suicide rates would damage the international reputation of the GDR, 
a fear that was compounded by a slight increase in suicide rates in the 1960s, and classified 
statistics on suicide from 1963 onwards.22 This reaction was typical. Nine years later, as a 
result of sudden rise in crime, the SED also stopped the publication of crime rates in the 
statistical yearbook.23 Attempts by East German experts to convince party officials that ‘the 
high suicide rate is not connected with the building of socialism’ went unheeded. Psychiatrist 
Helmut F. Spaete vainly admonished the authorities that ‘we cannot settle the problem by 
locking away the documents’.24 The ban on publication of suicide numbers was not lifted 
before 1990.  
At the same time, research into the causes of suicide in the GDR was not entirely impossible. 
Scholars produced dozens of regional and sectoral studies. Nevertheless, the classification of 
epidemological investigations thwarted an accumulation of knowledge and an open debate. 
Therefore it is hardly surprising that 30 years later, at the time of German reunification, the 
very same discussion began all over again. Medical scientists reiterated the assumption that 
factors such as stagnation and social isolation might have caused the higher suicide rate in 
East Germany.25 Again, evidence-based research rejected these simplistic views.26 Once 
again, however, just as in the 1960s, this discussion was confined to academic circles and had 
little impact on the public. 
 
Fact Check: Politically Motivated Suicides in the GDR 
 
                                                        
21 Cf. Reinhard Cordes, Die Selbstmorde in der DDR im gesamtdeutschen und internationalen Vergleich, 
Zeitschrift fuer aerztliche Fortbildung 58 (1964): 985-992; Hans Harmsen, ed., Sozialhygienische Analyse der 
unterschiedlichen Selbstmordverhaeltnisse unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, der “DDR” und West-Berlin (Hamburg: Akademie für Staatsmedizin, 1966). 
22 There were two exceptions: After a delay, the GDR reported the suicide rates for 1968 and 1969 to the World 
Health Organisation. Cf. Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1973): 34*. 
23 Cf. Johannes Raschka, “Fuer kleine Delikte ist kein Platz in der Kriminalitaetsstatistik”. Zur Zahl der 
politischen Haeftlinge waehrend der Amtszeit Honeckers (Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-Institut fuer 
Totalitarismusforschung, 1997),15. 
24 Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (herafter BLHA), Rep. 401, BT/RdB Potsdam, No. 8072, 171 and 186. 
25 H. Hoffmeister et al., “Selbstmordsterblichkeit in der DDR und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, 
Muenchener medizinische Wochenschrift 132 (1990): 609. Cf. Rolf Degen, “Ex-DDR: Hohe Selbstmordrate”, 
Psychologie heute 18 (1991): 14f. 
26 Cf. R. Wegener, “Suizidalitaet in Ost und West: Daten vorschnell interpretiert?”, Muenchener medizinische 
Wochenschrift 132 (1991): 21f. 
Before dealing with the reasons that led to the persistence of a politicised framing of suicide 
rates and a disregard for long-term perspectives and multifacetedness, it is necessary to 
determine the actual impact of political factors on suicide in the GDR as precisely as possible. 
The institution responsible for all unnatural deathts with political implications was the 
Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (herafter Stasi). During the 1960s, the ministry of state 
security established homicide squads in all districts of the GDR to investigate all deaths that 
had a possible political cause. These so called ‘Spezialkommissionen’ worked independently 
of the murder investigations carried out by the police.27 In East Berlin, the Stasi investigated 
an average of 13 suicides per year. In other districts, the number was lower, between five and 
ten. This equals to a share of 1.4 to 2.5 per cent of all suicides which had a possible political 
cause. Even these secret investigations found the vast majority of suicides were motivated by 
private factors. Typically, functionaries committed suicide due to family problems or 
diseases.  
Working in parallel to the ‘Spezialkommissionen’, ‘Hauptabteilung I’ of the Stasi investigated 
unnatural deaths in the army. Even if its final reports endeavoured to downplay the political 
factors, some files contain clear evidence of political conflicts. For example, a non-
commissioned officer who served as a border guard shot himself in 1988 after having found 
out that his girlfriend intended to apply for an exit visa. This had evoked a serious conflict. He 
also wanted to apply to emigrate from the GDR but knew that his chances were slim due to 
his status as a person cleared for access to secret information.28  
That example indicates that suspicions the Stasi might have concealed the political 
motivations that inspired some suicides are incorrect. The Stasi’s main task was to identify 
possible threats to the dictatorship, and so its officers were eager to detect even tiniest hints at 
oppositional thoughts or ideological conflicts. Another striking example is the suicide of a 
Polish student in the autumn of 1980 that was initially considered by the Stasi to be politically 
motivated on the slim grounds that it coincided with the rise of Polish opposition movement 
Solidarity (Solidarnosc), even though there was no specific evidence to support this 
assumption. In fact, the Stasi found out that the suicide was predominantly caused by 
emotional turmoil and jealousy after a disco.29 As in this case, the Stasi often presumed that 
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28 Cf. BStU, MfS, HA I, Nr. 14957/3, 586-588. 
29 Cf. BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 3700. 
political factors had led to suicide before the examination debunked this suspicion. As they 
were top secret and only accessible by a handful of top functionaries, there was hardly any 
reason to manipulate entire case files.  
While some conclusions and reports denied political motivations, various parts of the files–be 
it protocols of interrogations, informer reports, copies of documents, recorded phone calls, 
internal reports and action plans–make a critical reading and alternative conclusions possible.  
Moreover, the Stasi did not investigate all politically motivated suicides. The 
‘Spezialkommissionen’ were mainly occupied with private tragedies of state officials. At the 
same time, they missed a number of suicides with political implications, which are recorded 
elsewhere. This was primarily due to the fact that the competence of the Stasi was defined by 
the political function of the victim, be it a state official or a supposed enemy of the state. In 
addition, the police did not call the Stasi in all cases with political motivations. For example, 
several cases of young men who committed suicide for fear of conscription were only 
reported in police files.30  
Nevertheless, samples from the districts of Dresden and Potsdam of suicide reports compiled 
by the criminal police contain very few politically motivated suicides. Adding up all cases 
suggests that politically motivated suicides barely exceeded one per cent of all suicides. This 
is supported by the unofficial estimate by East Berlin’s chief public prosecutor who registered 
‘Staatsverdrossenheit’ (tiredness of the state) as a motivation in a mere 0.4 per cent of all 
suicides between 1975 and 1981.31 Thus, explaining the high rate of suicides in the GDR as a 
result of political repression is implausible. 
Likewise, the impact of historical events also needs careful scrutiny. Contrary to Mary 
Fulbrook’s statement that ‘suicide rates very clearly correlated with political events’ 
oscillations of the suicide rate can only rarely be attributed to historical incidents.32 The failed 
1953 uprising did not increase the suicide rate and the liberalisation of economic and youth 
policy after 1963 did not reduce the suicide rate. Fulbrook’s claim that the fall in the suicide 
rate around 1968 and 1989 can be explained by historical changes provides a particularly 
clear warning that changes in the suicide rate should be interpreted extremely cautiously.  
It is tempting to interpret the drop of the East German suicide rate around 1968 as a result of 
political disturbances, most notably the ‘Prague Spring’ and its suppression. But a closer look 
at the administration of death statistics reveals that the classification of suicides changed in 
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32 Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State. East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press, 2005), 107. 
1967/68. This update caused uncertainty and under-reporting, partly due to a shortage of new 
printed forms.33 And it might seem obvious to explain the decrease of the suicide rate in the 
second half of the 1980s as a result of the positive expectations aroused by the Gorbachev era. 
Statistical analysis has shown, however, that the drop was actually the result of a generational 
shift which gave the cohorts born after 1949 (with lower inclination to suicide than previous 
cohorts) more weight in the overall figure.34 This example also reminds us that overall 
statistics are aggregated data. Big numbers can conceal hidden trends, for instance, a high 
suicide rate of a sub-group. One example is forced collectivisation in the spring of 1960. This 
encouraged dozens of farmers to take their own lives but these incidents were still too 
infrequent to cause a steep increase in the overall rate.35  
Only in extreme situations did the coercive policies of the SED cause a statistically relevant 
number of additional suicides. Most notably, as Fulbrook rightly highlights, it was the 
building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 which coincided with rising suicide rates. The increase in 
the average suicide rate from 28.8 (in the time period 1956 to 1960) to 31.6 (1961 to 1965) 
equals a ten per cent increase in the suicide rate after the Berlin Wall was constructed. 
Moreover, there were more suicides in and around East Berlin, and among young people, 
reinforcing the assessment of observers that the closure of the border was experienced by 
many as a shock.36 The subsequent months of harsh repression as well as the introduction of 
conscription no doubt exacerbated some suicidal impulses. However, West German 
perception of an ‘epidemic’ was exaggerated.37 Even the ten per cent increase in the suicide 
rate cannot be attributed exclusively to the construction of the Berlin Wall. Other factors 
could have contributed, too, such as the rapidly aging population. As a result of nearly three 
million mostly young people escaping to the West, the percentage of pensioners in the GDR 
was significantly higher (18.6) compared to the FRG (14.3). Aging indirectly affects suicide 
rates as the likelihood of suicide increases with age.38  
Apart from these exceptional situations, certain sub-milieus in the GDR have been linked to 
high suicide rates such as prisons. Ehrhart Neubert has, for example, claimed that there were 
                                                        
33 Cf. Ivett Merkel, “Zur Epidemiologie der Suizide auf dem Gebiet der DDR und der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland von 1950 bis 1992” (Humboldt Univ. Berlin Ph.D. thesis, 1996). 
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remarkably high numbers of suicides in East German jails. Unfortunately, he uses absolute 
numbers not suitable for any conclusion at all; only relative numbers allow comparisons. In 
the case of prisons, a calculation of the suicide rate reveals that Neubert’s claims are 
inaccurate. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the suicide rate of prisoners was three to four 
times lower in the GDR than in the FRG. Apart from a poor handling of statistics, the flaw in 
Neubert’s reasoning stems from his equation of political repression and suicide. A random 
sample of a Stasi prison where 20 per cent of prisoners showed suicidal tendencies but 
nobody took their own life underlines that complexity of the relationship between suicide and 
repression.39 Whereas strict und inhumane measures in East German prisons made it almost 
impossible to take one’s own life, the relative leniency of West German prisons facilitated the 
‘success’ of acts of despair. 
Moreover, in addition to the strict regime, there were social factors that prevented East 
German prisoners from suicide such as the collective accommodation in big cells and the duty 
to work. And there were statistical effects such as the faster handling of criminal proceedings 
resulting in a smaller share of prisoners awaiting trial who were at the greatest risk of 
committing suicide. As for the ‘political prisoners’, the prospect of being released to the FRG 
helped many stay alive even in spite of the harsh conditions.40 
Another example of a sub-milieu with supposedly high suicide rates was the army (‘Nationale 
Volksarmee’). Here one could expect not only serious internal conflicts but also many self-
inflicted fatalities due the availability of lethal weapons. However, the suicide rate of soldiers 
was no higher than the rate of the corresponding male age group in civilian society. The 
reliability of internal military statistics gives even more justification to the conclusion that the 
army can’t be accused of having driven young men to suicide. This applies to the border 
guard as well. Dietmar Schultke believed that soldiers stationed directly at the Iron Curtain 
were particularly prone to a terror of the Stasi. He does not, however, calculate the frequency 
of suicides, which leads him to produce misleading argumentation.41 In fact, border guards 
did not commit suicide more frequently than in other units of the armed forces or East 
German civilians of the same age.42  
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Several factors help explain this surprising outcome. Soldiers who had attempted suicide were 
not allowed to serve at the border. Stasi staff–rather than causing suicides–endeavoured to 
identify suicidal soldiers in order to send them to other units. In August 1976, for instance, an 
informant reported that a drunken border guard had attempted suicide and had to be restrained 
by comrades. The soldier was under surveillance as he wanted to break off from the SED and 
had expressed sympathy with his brother, who had been sentenced for ‘slander of the state’. 
As a result of the Stasi report to the regimental commander, the soldier was deemed unreliable 
and reposted away from the border.43 
It is also recognized that a psychopathological disposition, often stemming from mental stress 
in early childhood, is a more grave suicidogenic factor than a temporary life crisis and acute 
internal conflict. This is not to deny the restrictions on personal freedom, pressure for 
conformity and repression that were all evident in the GDR’s armed forces but, apparently, 
obedience was only rarely so brutally enforced that it raised the question of life and death. 
This may also help explain the negligible correlation between political repression and the 
overall suicide rate of the GDR.  
If not repression, then what about the impact of social factors caused by the regime such as 
poor living conditions and the shortage economy? Some scholars consider elderly people to 
have been victims of a society that lauded youth and neglected those no longer needed for 
work. The suicide rate of pensioners was in fact extraordinarily high.44 Whereas the suicide 
rate of the whole GDR population was approximately 1.5 times higher than in the FRG, the 
suicide rate of East German pensioners was 2.15 times higher. The news magazine ‘Spiegel’ 
was not alone in blaming the SED regime for this discrepancy.45 However, the matter was 
more complex as the example of Saxony shows. The suicide rate of women aged 60 to 80 in 
the Saxon regions of the GDR was almost double that of the former Kingdom of Saxony 
shortly after 1900. The suicide rate of the corresponding male age group, though, underwent a 
sharp decline from 163 to 78. As a result, the gender difference diminished and the overall 
suicide rate of elderly people in Saxony slightly decreased during the intervening eight 
decades.46 Advantages such as the privilege to visit the Western hemisphere might have offset 
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disadvantages such as poor living conditions and inadequate health care, if these factors were 
relevant at all.  
 
Behaviour Patterns 
 
After having exhausted the critical potential of quantitative methodology one might ask 
whether such a prosaic approach risks overlooking something important. Or, to put it 
differently: Is there perhaps a qualitative way to relate suicide to the political culture of the 
GDR? There were dozens of suicides caused by political and social factors to a large extent. 
A qualitative analysis of these cases can reveal some specific conflicts that existed only in 
communist regimes. For example, conflicts within the SED leadership caused suicides. In 
1958, the central committee economics secretary Gerhart Ziller committed suicide after being 
accused of being involved in a conspiracy against the head of the SED Walter Ulbricht. In 
1965, the head of the state planning commission Erich Apel shot himself dead on the day 
when a trade agreement with the Soviet Union he had opposed was ratified. Both suicides are 
indicative of the dictatorial climate within the SED. One should not forget, however, the role 
of personality. The sensitive and emotional Ziller did not ‘fit the apparatchik mould’, and 
Apel was ‘an extremely ambitious man who found defeats difficult to bear’.47  
Likewise, a few managers can be considered victims of (internalised) pressures in the socialist 
economy. The SED certainly created a completely new political and social context, and 
suicidal behaviour was of course not just a continuation of a 19th century practice but 
influenced by the experience of ‘real existing socialism’. Examples abound that mirror the 
specific context of the GDR. A few dissidents comitted suicide as a result of blackmail by the 
Stasi. There were pupils who took to heart the exaggerated reactions of their teachers to their 
pranks, and their subsequent accusations of political provocation, with deadly consequences. 
If one does not neglect the influence of the personality, and if one is self-disciplined enough 
to withstand the temptation of drawing far-reaching conclusions, one can make valid points 
about the impact of the political system on one or another individual case. 
Such incidents did not, however, increase the overall rate. Social conditions in the GDR may 
have caused some suicides but they also probably prevented others by, for example, providing 
social security. Most suicides which can be attributed to the political culture of the GDR had 
their equivalents in earlier democratic and monarchic societies in the territory occupied by the 
East German state. One can legitimately accuse the GDR of preserving the high frequency of 
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suicide, of providing a socialist facade for old conflicts, and of failing to establish a more 
humane society but the fact remains that the dictatorship did not consistently increase the total 
number of suicides.   
A qualitative approach, however, provides some clues that point to a ‘shame culture’ as being 
the main cause of East Germany’s high suicide rate.48 The head of a collective farm hanged 
himself in 1968 because he felt responsible for not fulfilling the quota. A police officer in 
Leipzig took his life in 1974 after his wife threatened to inform the party about his love affair 
with another woman. And a party official in Magdeburg committed suicide in 1976 due to the 
shame he felt at his undignified behaviour during a drinking spree.49 In all three cases there is 
little specific impact of the political system as such. But these cases can be associated with 
general patterns of behaviour, which might have increased the likelihood of suicide. Even if 
one does not buy the stereotype of the ‘depressive-obsessive’ character of the inhabitants of 
Saxony, the extraordinarily high suicide frequency in that Southern part of the GDR 
encourages a focus on specific behavioural patterns. 50 It is promising to consider unique 
aspects of national character, notably the prevailing concept of guilt as research in 
Scandinavia has demonstrated.51 Particularly relevant to the GDR is the finding that high 
suicide rates in Denmark can be attributed to the frequent use of guilt arousal as a child-
rearing practice.52 Several scholars have concurred with the theory that a predominantly 
Protestant ‘shame culture’ in East Germany has led to more suicides than in West Germany’s 
large Catholic regions which possessed a more cheerful and light-hearted mentality.53 The 
more restrained attitudes of East Germans contributed to a more ‘consensus-oriented conflict 
culture’. According to Bieri, suicide rates are higher in societies where aggressive behaviour 
is disapproved.54 
The SED seems to have perpetuated this sense of duty and obedience to traditional moral 
norms, and in this regard the actions of the Communist party were not dissimilar to those of 
the Protestant Church. Indeed, circumstantial evidence suggests that religious norms as well 
                                                        
48 Cf. Haller, Freiwillig sterben, 43. 
49 Cf. BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 1601; Staatsarchiv Leipzig, BdVP Leipzig, 24.1, Nr. 2353; BStU, MfS, BV 
Magdeburg, Abt. IX, Nr. 1259. 
50 Bernhard Honnigfort, “Die wenigsten Freitode gab es zur Wendezeit”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 Sept. 1993. 
51 Cf. Herbert Hendin, “Suicide: The psychosocial dimension”, Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 8 (1978): 
99-117. 
52 Jeanne Block, Bjorn Christiansen, A Test of Hendin’s Hypotheses Relating Suicide in Scandinavia to Child-
Rearing Orientations, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 7 (1966): 267-288. 
53 See as examples Andreas Schulze, Selbstmord und Selbstmordversuch in Leipzig. Zur Erklaerung suizidaler 
Handlungen in der DDR (Regensburg: S. Roderer, 1986); Steffen Heide/Erich Mueller, “Suizid – Sachsen bleibt 
seiner Tradition treu”, poster, private archive Steffen Heide. 
54 Oliver Bieri, Suizid und sozialer Wandel in der westlichen Gesellschaft (Zuerich: Editions à la Carte, 2005), 
183.  
as divorce rates and other regional patterns of behaviour had the most significant long-term 
impact on the frequency of suicide.  
Since the 19th century, Protestant regions have had higher suicide rates than Catholic parts of 
Germany. As the GDR predominantly inherited Protestant areas, denominational differences 
with the FRG, which possessed large Catholic regions such as the Rhineland, provide an 
explanation. One might question the applicability of religion to the atheistic GDR as the 
percentage of believers dropped from 91 to 30 during four decades of communist rule.55 But 
despite the fact that denominational differences and their causes are disputed,56 there were 
signs of a persistent influence of denominational attitudes to suicide in the GDR. Whereas 
suicide rates in Protestant regions remained high, Catholic regions, such as the Eichsfeld, still 
had a suicide rate that was 25 per cent lower than the rest of the GDR in the 1970s.57  
One explanation for these denominational differences in the frequency of suicides is that the 
Catholic Church prevented suicides by providing the possibility of confession. That practice 
can help unburden a Catholics’ conscience, whereas Protestants (and atheists) are supposedly 
left alone with feelings of guilt and responsibility. Another possible explanation is that the 
different denominations have very different attitudes towards suicide. Whereas the Catholic 
Church considered suicide a mortal sin until 1983, the Protestant Church developed a more 
empathetic attitude to suicide. This also explains the notable difference in the suicide rates of 
pensioners in East and West Germany. It can be assumed that the Christian faith particularly 
mattered for elderly people in the face of death. This is further corroborated by Schulz’ 
findings that a substantial proportion of East Germans still preferred Christian funerals.58 An 
additional factor–also linked to denomination to some extent–is divorce.59 Saxony, East 
Germany’s suicide hotspot, also had high divorce rates. In 1910, the divorce rate was three 
times higher than in mainly Catholic Westfalia, and 50 per cent higher than the average for 
the German Empire as a whole.60 Similarly, the divorce rate in the GDR was approximately 
50 per cent higher than in the FRG.61  
Apart from the abovementioned factors that contributed to higher suicide rates in East 
Germany, there are also grounds for assuming that the East-West difference was somewhat 
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smaller than official figures indicate. The fact that several vague categories, such as ‘sudden 
death’ or ‘age and infirmity’, made up an extraordinarily high percentage of the causes of 
death in West German statistics gives cause for such a surmise. Moreover, the frequency of 
these dubious causes of death is most pronounced in the older age groups where the East-
West-difference in the suicide rate was also most dramatic.62 It should also be noted that the 
coincidence of statistical inaccuracy and denomination is no accident. Even if a case study in 
Catholic Aachen, which found that the actual number of suicides was twice as high as the 
official figures recorded, might be an extreme example, the extraordinarily high number of 
unrecorded suicides in Catholic regions is irrefutable.63 Nevertheless, the tendency to cover 
up the number of suicides in the FRG cannot provide a full explanation for the difference in 
the official suicide rates in East and West Germany as the East German professor of 
criminalistics Hans Girod erroneously suggested.64  
To sum up, many political and social factors suggested by Western authors (most notably 
political repression and poor living conditions) can be ruled out to a large extent. Conversely, 
long-term differences regarding the concept of guilt, which refer to mentality and 
denomination, are worthy of consideration. 
 
The Persistence of a Misperception 
 
Neither quantitative nor qualitative approaches support a strong correlation between 
dictatorship and suicide. Why, then, was there such a long-lasting misperception of suicide in 
the GDR? First of all, there is a long tradition of understanding suicide as a ‘sign of the 
times’. That tradition harks back to the beginnings of systematic statistical registration in the 
19th century.65 Most notably, the sociologist Émile Durkheim conceptualised suicide as a 
symptom of destabilised social ties. His theory influenced subsequent generations of scholars, 
and also many publicists.66 During the Weimar Republic, for instance, contemporaries quickly 
associated suicide with diverse factors such as national weakness, mass culture, authoritarian 
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pedagogies or capitalist exploitation. Both left and right wing organisations exploited 
individual cases to berate the existing political and economic order.67 To some extent, the 
debate on the GDR’s suicide rate–although less intense–echoed this earlier discourse.68 
However, one should not overlook the differences between the discourse on suicide in the 
GDR and earlier periods of German history. The main focus of Cold War discourse lay on 
people driven into suicide by the dictatorship of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). 
This pattern of thought emphasized ‘fatalistic’ suicide (which occurs only in a footnote in 
Durkheims study) in contrast to the prevalence of ‘anomic’ suicide in previous debates. From 
the scattered instances of suicide among dissidents, would-be émigrés or SED officials who 
had fallen out of favour, the Western discourse established a slim but influential connection 
between suicide rates and the GDR’s totalitarianism.  
It has to be admitted, first of all, that this politicised interpretation of East German suicides 
was not completely far-fetched. There were several tragic individual cases. No doubt, some 
can be considered as victims of repression. The suicide of Matthias Domaschk is a prominent 
example. The young dissident hanged himself in a Stasi prison after he was arbitrarily 
arrested, suffered two days of interrogations with blackmail and sleep deprivation, and signed 
a commitment to work as Stasi informant. This was not the only politically motivated suicide 
which became known in the West. In 1976, the Protestant clergyman Oskar Bruesewitz 
protested against the communist indoctrination of the youth by self-immolation. In the 
following year, Western media featured a Romeo and Juliet case. A couple committed suicide 
after the young man who had left the country was not allowed to return to the GDR to visit his 
girlfriend.69 
Moreover, the challenging economic situation in the GDR also created serious conflicts. For 
example, the manager of a sugar factory hurled himself off a silo in the autumn of 1978. He 
had done everything to better the poor performance of the factory but some organisational and 
technological problems proved to be unsolvable. Despite his efforts, the district council (Rat 
des Bezirkes) criticised him for the serious shortcomings in strong terms. The factory 
manager was a selfless, conscientious, modest but also optimistic and humorous person. Apart 
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from his tendency to ask too much from himself, the police could not find any issues 
regarding his personality or mental health.70  
The files of the education authorities also contain a number of suicides caused by political 
repression. Even if these suicides were not always openly recorded as political, the files 
contain clear evidence. For example, the suicide of a female teacher in 1984. The report of the 
education authority which blamed family problems was not entirely wrong. However, the 
primary cause of her suicide was that her husband had emigrated.71 Her first reaction was a 
nervous breakdown. After her recovery she initially pledged to file for divorce but a couple of 
months later she applied for an exit visa for herself and her two children. Unfortunately, the 
authorities did not accept her private wish to reunite the family and considered the application 
a political provocation. She was also dismissed from her job and proceeded to take her life. 
Similarly, the suicide of a 14-year-old pupil in 1982 was linked to political conflicts. The boy 
wanted to become a teacher and appeared to be a role model as a result of his performance 
and allegiance to the state. As a good pupil and secretary of the Free German Youth, his 
career was as good as secure were there not for the somewhat conflicting worldviews of his 
parents. Whereas his father supported the official party line and was engaged as a speaker of 
the parents’ committee, his mother was affiliated with the church. Accordingly, the pupil 
joined both the official preparation course for the ‘Jugendweihe’ (youth dedication) and the 
confirmation classes provided by the church. However, as a concession to the mother’s 
religiosity his parents decided that the son would only take part in the religious confirmation 
and not in the Jugendweihe–despite the fact that his father had helped prepare the state 
ceremony. One can only speculate which specific discussions and conflicts developed in that 
situation as they were not recorded in the files. On the day of the suicide, the only 
conspicuous sign of internal turmoil was that the pupil behaved in school in a ‘provocative 
manner’ that was, for him, unprecedented. He criticised, for instance, the GDR’s refusal to 
allow citizens to freely choose their place of residence.72  
In both cases, the stern and hostile atmosphere of the dictatorship might have ‘driven into 
suicide’ people who were unlikely to take their life under different political circumstances. 
However, and this is crucial, the total number of such cases appears to be small. Western 
journalists considering these individual cases just as the tip of an iceberg overestimated the 
internal terror of the GDR society. An exaggerated politicisation of suicides, a limited 
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knowledge about mental disorders, and the SED’s treatment of suicide as a taboo contributed 
to such a misperception. These factors will now be discussed in more detail. 
The eagerness to exploit the high suicide rates in the GDR for propaganda purposes during 
the Cold War is, in retrospect, obvious. This is supported by a closer look at the way certain 
suicides were publicised in the West. Often, it was the interaction of West and East German 
actors that lead to a politically inspired simplification of the complex factors that had led to a 
suicide in order to level further criticism at the SED dictatorship.  
In 1977, the dissident writer Reiner Kunze–who just had left the GDR for good–gave an 
interview to the ‘Hessischer Rundfunk’ radio station. On that occasion, Kunze mentioned the 
suicide of a young man who he believed had been interrogated and blackmailed by the Stasi. 
Allegedly, the young man’s forced collaboration with the Stasi had led him to suicide. As his 
actual Stasi file documents, this was, however, not the case.73 The young man had been under 
surveillance since 1975. After breaking from his father, who was loyal to the state, he had 
joined the rebellious youth in the ‚Junge Gemeinde’, the youth organisation of the Protestant 
church.74 From the Stasi’s perspective, the young man with his hippy attitudes appeared to be 
a security risk. He had hitchhiked all over the country and had talked about becoming a 
conscientious objector. As his housemate was an informant, the Stasi also found out that he 
had purloined some cans from work. Made to explain himself, he quit his job as driver and 
worked in a nursing home run by the church. Soon, there was an unexpected confrontation 
with conservative staff. He suffered from unfavourable living conditions and was unhappy in 
love. In this situation he applied for an exit visa but then, on the advice of a clergyman, 
withdraw his application.    
In November 1976, the young man spent some days in Jena at the same time as the 
denaturalisation of the dissident singer/songwriter Wolf Biermann against which some of his 
friends filed a petition. In a harsh reaction, the Stasi arrested dozens of suspects. Witnessing 
the arrest of his friends almost literally scared the young man to death; he tried to commit 
suicide but was rescued. Two days later the Stasi interrogated him. That experience seriously 
intimidated the young man. He was afraid of being re-arrested and had vague suspicions that 
he was under surveillance. Nevertheless, he never suspected that his housemate had betrayed 
him and that two Stasi informers followed him when he moved to East Berlin in the January 
of 1977.  
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Most of the new problems he faced after his arrival in the East German capital had, however, 
nothing to do with the Stasi. Rather, a private quarrel thwarted his plan to get a residence 
permit by marrying a friend for the sake of appearances. The disillusioned 20-year-old then 
decided to live in a shared flat and his flatmates recommended a cemetery where he could be 
employed as a gardener by the church. Before that, and this is the only provable Stasi 
intervention, the secret police prevented him from working as film projectionist.75 But this 
failure brought about by the Stasi behind his back was just one in a row of mishaps. It 
certainly did not trigger his final act of despair. Much more important was the suicide of a 
friend. Returning from the funeral in a depressive state, the young man slashed his wrists 
because he wanted to suffer in the same way as his suicidal friend. Later on, he gassed 
himself. The interrogations and clandestine actions of the Stasi no doubt aggravated the young 
man’s difficulties. But his restlessness, his pessimism and his unhappy existence can’t be 
attributed to this alone. 
This example illustrates how the interaction of bereaved East Germans and the West German 
media contributed to a Cold War stereotype which obscured psychological factors. To what 
extent did those who committed suicide pursue a similar goal? According to Jean Baechler, 
suicides who politicised their suffering did not misrepresent it intentionally.76 Rather, they 
projected their very private drama onto a political situation rewriting their inner thoughts and 
feelings as a public performance. 
Examples for this kind of individual identity management are the suicides of imprisoned 
offenders who blamed the political system for their misery.77 For example, in the autumn of 
1982 an inmate of ‘Bautzen I’ prison set himself on fire. Before that, he teared up a sheet in 
half, wrote political protest slogans on each part, displayed them at the window of the cell, 
rubbed floor polish into his skin and pressed the alarm button. In the previous year, he had 
already displayed another political slogan outside of his cell welcoming the Polish 
Solidarnosc movement. For this protest action, he was sentenced to an additional 16 months 
because of ‘slander against the state’. His immediate reaction was to go on hunger strike. 
Then he was transferred from Cottbus to Bautzen where his behaviour had been–in contrast to 
his lack of discipline and refusal to work in the past–unobtrusive until quite recently. Only on 
the day of his self-immolation did he refuse to fulfil his quota and was sent back to the cell.78  
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After the transfer of the severely injured man to hospital where he died the next day, the Stasi 
searched the prison cell and found a suicide note behind a mirror. Some historians seem to 
believe in the authenticity of suicide notes and draw far-reaching conclusions from it.79 In this 
case, it would be naive to take the content seriously. The fact alone that the letter cites an 
alleged distribution of leaflets that probably never took place highlights its illusionary 
character. The suicide note also adopts a very aggressive tone. The GDR is accused of 
Bolshevik terror and sullied as social-fascistic system. Names of West German organisations 
active in the Cold War such as ‘Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit’ or ‘Gesellschaft fuer 
Menschenrechte’ are mixed with all kinds of totalitarian vocabulary including 
‘Kampfbuende’, ‘Fuehrer’ and ‘Endloesung’. The author even asks his compatriots to commit 
acts of sabotage and to assassinate members of the SED. Nevertheless, the letter was an act of 
political protest rather than an explanation for the suicide.  
But to what extent can we attribute his suicide to political factors? Two days before the 
prisoner died, fellow inmates attacked him physically owing to debts that he could not or was 
not willing to pay back. On the morning of his suicide, two prisoners insisted that he should 
settle the debts immediately. A closer look at his biography further supports the assumption 
that the prisoner’s accusation of the political system downplayed other factors. Of course, he 
was a political prisoner since 1980. He had attempted to leave the country–a political crime in 
the GDR. However, the unusual harshness of his sentence–four years and eight months 
imprisonment–was a consequence of the fact that he had already been imprisoned for fraud 
and robbery twice. Generally, his life before 1980 looks like a sequence of professional and 
private failures. After failing to complete his vocational training as locksmith, he had begun to 
fulfil his pledge to serve in the army for ten years. Due to serious violations of discipline, the 
army demoted and discharged him. He got divorced, changed his job frequently and 
committed a series of petty crimes. Released early during an amnesty at the end of 1979, he 
decided to move to West Germany where he hoped to earn more money and to have more 
freedom. It is pointless to speculate how he would have lived after a successful escape but it is 
not unlikely that new kinds of conflicts would have arisen in the West as evidenced by those 
East Germans who moved to West Germany and then committed suicide.80 
It is unknown why the prisoner was not released to the FRG as he had hoped. Since the 1960s 
there were clandestine ransom deals resulting in the release of 33.755 political prisoners to the 
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West.81 His disappointment at being ignored was the main reason for the prisoner’s political 
provocation. Some days before he took his life he told a fellow inmate that he would ‘think of 
something’. His attempt to frame his own case politically made his criminal past fade and 
created the impression that he was a martyr. West German media presented his suicide this 
way without delving into his background. 
The abovementioned examples corroborate observations at the macro level that tensions 
which arose as a result of the social order of the GDR and the dictatorial rule of the SED 
increased the number of potential suicides only slightly. The number of people who would 
have chosen not to kill themselves had the political circumstances been different was certainly 
small and even those suicides which can be considered to have been politically motivated 
were often much more complex. 
An additional factor which facilitated misinterpretations was the limited knowledge about 
pathological aspects. In March 1977, for instance, a West Berlin newspaper quoted the fiancé 
of a 22-year-old nurse who had committed suicide in East Berlin. The fiancé had escaped over 
the border one year before and attributed his partner’s suicide to the Stasi interrogations that 
she had endured.82 After the fiancé had arived in the FRG he had vainly tried to arrange for 
his partner to be smuggled across the border while while she had applied for an exit visa.83 
Her application was, however, rejected in November 1976. This may have aggravated her 
mental health but it was not the direct cause of her suicide which happened four months later. 
The absence of an immediate trigger provoked widely differing interpretations. Her fiancé 
accused the political system of the GDR whereas colleagues and members of her family 
blamed her problematic personality. In fact, she had repeatedly suffered from depression.84 
Even if she had left the country-it may not have kept her alive. Nevertheless, while it is one-
sided to blame only the state for her suicide, it was the dictatorship that prevented her from 
seeking an alternative solution to her mental anguish.  
Whereas both sides in the Cold War tended to exploit inner (mental) and outer (socio-
political) factors, it is a complex set of circumstances which characterises many suicides. The 
case of a work team leader of a concrete plant further corroborates this. This man was 
unexpectedly offered the chance to buy a ‘Lada’ car because his employer appreciated him as 
an exemplary and conscientious worker. Normally, consumers had to wait ten or more years 
to buy a car. In this context, to immediately obtain a rare and expensive ‘Lada’ was an 
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extraordinary privilege. Unfortunately, the man realised he could not take the opportunity to 
exchange his ‘Trabant’ for a ‘Lada’ due to lack of money. This triggered a nervous 
breakdown. He suffered from crying fit and odd delusions such as walking with Lenin trough 
Berlin showing him heaps of dirt which were to be removed. After two months in a 
psychiatric hospital he came back to work but still with signs of depression. His transfer to 
another workplace did not ease the situation. He told colleagues that he had sold his dacha in 
order to improve his financial situation but regretted this decision. When a foot operation for 
his son was scheduled he became heavily agitated, went to a neighbour’s property and slashed 
his wrists.85 After a two weeks investigation, the detailed Stasi report revealed that the 
unexpected offer to get an attractive car had triggered the man’s suicidal feelings but were not 
the deep cause. For years there had been conflicts within the family. The man was plagued 
with feelings of guilt regarding his mentally handicapped daughter. After his return from 
hospital, a number of pathological fears had also culminated in a believe that their son 
suffered from a malignant tumour. Although his wife assured him that the son would undergo 
a harmless operation, he panicked and committed suicide.  
His case is one of many suicides caused or aggravated by family conflicts and mental health 
issues. In the light of statistical data, it can be considered representative of a substantial share 
of suicides. Police investigations in different parts of the GDR found relationship conflicts the 
main cause in 11 to 22 per cent of all cases and medical studies highlighted mental health 
issues as the main cause of up to 30 per cent of all suicides. In addition, most sources 
attributed more than a third of all suicides to serious illnesses. In contrast, several studies of 
the motivations for suicide in the GDR found that conflicts related to social circumstances 
were evident in a far lower percentage of cases. In only 5 to 10 per cent of all cases, ‘fear of 
punishment’ was considered a motivation and problems at work were recorded in only 1 to 3 
per cent of all cases.86 
A third factor, which helped sustain false suspicion about the correlation between the political 
system and suicide rates in the GDR was the dictatorship’s own decision to treat both 
individual suicides and statistics on suicide as taboo. More often than not, the concealment of 
information had unintended consequences. The fact alone that investigations of suicides were 
considered a state secret aroused suspicions and encouraged misleading interpretations as, for 
example, in the case of the sudden death of the US-American singer and actor Dean Reed. 
The left wing artist had lived in the GDR since the 1970s and had married one of the most 
beautiful actresses of the GDR. In 1986, he committed suicide. The SED officially declared 
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Reed’s death a ‘tragic accident’. The concealment of his actual cause of death aroused 
suspicions of murder among friends and relatives. Western media circulated claims that the 
prominent singer had died after his car plunged into a lake and was found with a rope around 
his neck.87 That graphic account was a combination of half-truths and errors, but there was no 
chance to get a more adequate picture of what happened as the homicide squad of the Stasi 
investigated the death case and kept all details secret. Like other speculations made at the 
time, such as that Dean Reed was an agent of Western intelligence, or that the Stasi had 
murdered him in order to prevent his return to the USA, rumours about his death were 
completely wrong. They could not, however, be debunked before the opening of the Stasi 
archive. The file provides clear evidence of a private conflict. After a serious argument with 
his wife and a first attempt to slash his wrists Reed had driven his car to a lake. Damages to 
the car indicated his excited mental state. A rope was found nearby indicating that he 
probably intended to hang himself. Instead he chose to take an overdose of drugs and plunged 
into the water swimming until he became unconscious and drowned. There is not the slightest 
hint at that any other person was involved. Also, the investigation could not detect any 
political influence on his decision. Reed’s suicide note supports that conclusion. Although 
hastily written and by no means objective, the 15 page long letter highlights Reed’s state of 
mind at death’s door. Remarkably, he reinforces his unshakeable belief in communism–as if 
he had apprehended the erroneous suspicions his death would arouse. Apart from that, the 
letter is mainly an extended criticism of his wife.88 
25 years earlier, the tabooing of an East German army general’s suicide provoked similar 
suspicions. General Vinzenz Mueller died of self-defenestration on the 12 May 1961. In order 
to maintain a pretence of normality, he was buried with a state funeral. This could not prevent 
West Berlin media from claiming that officers of the East German police and the Stasi had 
driven him to suicide. According to an eyewitness account that was publicised in the West, a 
prison transport vehicle had driven up in front of the retired general’s house. Shortly 
thereafter several officers had entered the house and Mueller had jumped out of the window. 
The details of the report were close to the actual run of events but the whole interpretation 
was erroneous.  
Mueller was one of the few high-ranking Wehrmacht officers who had joined the communists 
during his time as a prisoner of war in the Soviet Union. In the GDR, he became Chief of 
Staff of the National People’s Army and deputy minister of defence. As part of the general 
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policy of the SED to get rid of the Nazi experts after the foundation and consolidation of the 
army, Mueller was retired in 1958. Subsequently, he was no longer invited to state 
ceremonies, and was even kept under surveillance. However, his permanent fear of arrest was 
unjustified. His persecution mania was at least partly a result of private conflicts. Mueller’s 
wife had committed suicide and he had an uneasy conscience because of his liaison with a 
young woman. In order to escape the embarrassing situation, the retired general prepared to 
leave the GDR at the beginning of 1961. At the very last moment he cancelled this plan due to 
revelations in a West German newspaper that he had been involved in mass shootings during 
World War Two. As his situation appeared to be precarious in both German states now, 
Mueller developed signs of ill health and was hospitalised for 12 weeks. Back home, on the 
day of his suicide, a black ambulance arrived to bring him to the psychiatric ward of the 
hospital for government officials. Mueller’s children had arranged that transport under the 
pretence that he would receive ‘treatment for the kidneys’. Presumably, Mueller was 
suspicious and misinterpreted the situation (which appeared even more threatening due to the 
additional presence of a fire engine) as the moment of arrest he was scared of.89  
The SED had good reasons for silencing this suicide. A leading military expert allegedly 
involved in war crimes was the last thing the GDR needed in its ideological battle for 
recognition as a true ‘anti-fascist state’. Once again, however, the concealment did not work 
smoothly. In the long run, constant denial and the distribution of false information backfired 
and revived the Cold War image of a dictatorship which frequently drove its citizens to 
suicide. 
In the West, there was a certain eagerness to attribute suicides to political conflicts even if no 
reliable information was available.90 For the sake of political expedience long-term cultural 
factors as well as pathological factors were abscured. In the East, the treatment of suicide as a 
political taboo characterised by censorship, conjecture and rumour also unintentionally 
exacerbated the tendency for suicides in the GDR to become politicised.  
 
Summary 
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The Cold War stereotype of a suicidogenic totalitarian regime persisted in public discourse 
for decades. Academic debates had only little impact. Partly, the SED regime fuelled 
suspicions by making the topic a political taboo. Partly, the bereaved and the victims 
themselves framed suicides politically and provided Western media with the stories they were 
looking for. However, whereas political repression is clearly an important factor in some 
individual cases, it was not the reason for the high frequency of suicides in the GDR. Contrary 
to superficial statistical surveys and anecdotal evidence, political conflicts played only a 
marginal role.  
Both statistical data and individual case studies strongly support this conclusion. The 
dictatorship had no substantial influence on the rates of suicide in several sub-levels of the 
GDR society which were the most likely to be affected by repression such as prisons and the 
army. Generally, the communist regime did not increase the number of people who 
committed suicide significantly. Even during the forced collectivisation campaign in 1960 
when dozens of farmers committed suicide, the effect on the overall rate was barely 
detectable.  
In order to understand East Germany’s high suicide rates, one has to acknowledge long-term 
differences between East and West Germany which can be associated with regional patterns 
of behaviour. Factors such as religious denomination, mentality and divorce are much more 
important than political repression or other social factors. Moreover, the fact that the socialist 
society failed to bring suicide rates down, despite full employment, low crime rates and 
comprehensive social care, highlights the limited penetration of society even in a state with 
totalitarian aspirations.  
The Western misperception of suicide in East Germany did not vanish with the end of the 
GDR in 1990. After the fall of the Wall, it was tempting to interpret the drop of suicide rates 
as a success of liberalisation and democratisation. All the more as suicide rates are almost at 
the level in the eastern and western parts of Germany at present. But the rapid fall of East 
German suicide rates after 1990 was hardly a success of reunification.91 A close look at the 
statistics debunks the enticing idea that freedom prevents suicide. A generational breakdown 
of the figures reveals a creeping convergence of suicide rates that began a long time ago. 
Whereas the recorded suicides of elderly people differed widely in the GDR and the FRG, 
those generations born after 1949 showed almost no difference to their West German 
contemporaries regarding suicide. For decades, this fundamental change remained hidden in 
the statistics which were dominated by suicides of the elderly. The downtrend started to 
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become visible only during the 1980s when those age groups with lower suicide rates gained 
more and more influence on the overall rate.  
It is ironic that restrictions on research prevented the communist leaders from becoming 
aware of let alone understanding the positive trend. At the same time, the anti-communist 
spectre that haunted the West blurred its vision, too. Only by dispensing with both the 
communist regime’s taboos and the unjustified accusations levelled by western critics, can 
another conundrum be revealed: The remarkable decrease in suicide rates in East and West 
Germany after 1990 which has not yet been completely understood but can at least be finally 
recognized.  
 
 
 
